

examples, including examples of horrendous wrongs, to examine the nature of forgiveness. Any victim may justifiably resent someone who wrongs her, but unlike theorists who insist that forgiveness requires a victim to overcome resentment, Lippett argues that we should think of forgiveness as a “threshold concept,” one that involves an effort to transcend resentment without necessarily eradicating it. Of course, even as a threshold concept, such forgiveness may still be difficult to motivate given the harm done to the victim. But this is where the Kierkegaardian notion of “love’s vision” that Lippett develops comes into play. Such vision looks past the faults of the wrongdoer and willfully chooses to see the good in him, which contributes to the well-being of the victim and can also create opportunities for reconciliation. To love a wrongdoer in this way, that is, to forgive him, often begins with a recognition of one’s own past need for forgiveness and gratitude for that forgiveness, and it also involves a humility that shifts the victim’s focus from the harm done to herself and redirects it to the good of others, including the good of the wrongdoer. Moreover, such forgiveness carries with it hope for the wrongdoer—particularly the hope that he will become the sort of person with whom one could reenter into a relationship, which, among other things, will require that he accept his guilt, repent, and attempt to make amends. This is an excellent book, and Lippett has put forward a convincing account of forgiveness that makes a valuable contribution to the literature. Nevertheless, it could be helpful to delve into the broader discussion of the unique nature of interpersonal relationships to help distinguish this theory of forgiveness from alternatives. Further, this Kierkegaardian theory of forgiveness bears important similarities to a Thomistic account, which also sees forgiveness as an act of love, and thus it might prove fruitful to compare such accounts. But these are not shortcomings of this book; they are simply additional areas to explore in defense of an interpersonal account of forgiveness. The prose is widely accessible, but this will be of particular interest to Kierkegaard specialists and scholars interested in the topic of forgiveness.

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CLASSICAL THEISM AND BUDDHISM: CONNECTING METAPHYSICAL AND ETHICAL SYSTEMS. By Tyler Dalton McNabb and Erik Baldwin. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2022. Pp. viii + 161. Hardback, \$115.00; Paperback, \$39.95.

McNabb and Baldwin consider Buddhism and classical theism as distinct spiritual systems with unique metaphysical and ethical views. Classical theism centers around monotheistic beliefs, while Buddhism takes a non-theistic stance. They note that theism exhibits logical and dogmatic features due to attributing cosmic phenomena to the creation and supervision of an

all-knowing singular God. However, this idea opposes Buddhist metaphysics, which highlights dependent origination and *kar-ma*’s sequential nature. Moreover, McNabb and Baldwin assert that theological ethics in classical theism feature centralized divine directives, whereas Buddhist principles are exemplified by *ahimsā*, the Eightfold Path, and compassion for all beings, all of which entail unique ethical frameworks. Although the ethical principles initially appear to be in conflict, McNabb and Baldwin suggest possible integration. They also acknowledge the shared moral values of both traditions, promoting similar virtues and searching for the purpose of life. Both traditions would encourage spiritual development through various religious frameworks. Based on this premise, they refute John Hick’s (1922–2012) idea of religious pluralism and assert that classical theists can incorporate Buddhism’s principles, including “emptiness,” without contradicting their fundamental beliefs. However, McNabb and Baldwin do not aim to establish a novel secular consensus founded on particular theistic doctrines and Buddhist ideals. Rather, they aim to establish objective foundations for the concepts of both Buddhism and monotheism. Overall, the book explores the rational contrasts between the two traditions, demonstrating their plausibility and offering bold new perspectives on the philosophy of religions.

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Religion and Law

THE NO-STATE SOLUTION: A JEWISH MANIFESTO.

By Daniel Boyarin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023. Pp. 180. \$30.00, hardcover.

This book is a manifesto in response to Boyarin’s version of “the Jewish question,” namely what does it mean to be a Jew. He insists that neither “religion” nor member of a “nation-state” can serve as adequate answers to this question. Rather, he offers here “an argument for an *ethical* form of *vibrant* Jewish collective continuity.” This vision is explicitly diasporic; Jews are a people, necessarily, of no state. As Boyarin puts it, “We have a diaspora, a ‘family’ of ancestors, grounded in a narrative of genealogy and not sovereignty; time and not space.” There is here, of course, a critique of Israel—“well on the way to being a racist, fascist state,” as Boyarin puts it—but his primary interest is a critique and dismissal of state logic and forms (including that specter of sovereignty) in general. He writes, “It is possible to imagine nations without states, not as an anomaly or deficiency, but as a significantly better way to organize human/Jewish cultural vitality without sacrificing the claims for universal justice.” It is for this imagination of the possibilities of the *unstate* that this book will most interest scholars and students of religion and law. Boyarin’s unstate vision of Jewishness is indebted to

“the black radical traditions,” from Fanon and Césaire to Fred Moten and Charisse Burden-Stelly, traditions that focus both on a celebration of the particularity of a people and on a devotion to liberation for all peoples. Rejecting “Federations; Councils; Leadership committees; sociologists who study Jewish continuity by counting babies and checking out their mothers’ ‘identity’” in favor of “Jews, singing, dancing, speaking, and writing in Hebrew, Yiddish, *Judezmo*, learning the Talmud in all sorts of ways, fighting together for justice for Palestinians and Black Lives Matter,” Boyarin’s vision rejects both Appiah’s model of “cosmopolitanism” and the logic and form of the state. Tantalizingly, Boyarin offers another logic and form as an alternative to or otherwise than the stately: the “Talmudic,” a vibrancy “rooted ... in conversation,” alternately described as a weave and a mosaic, the past always present, still speaking. The “Talmudic,” as Boyarin explains it, is both an aesthetic (with distinctive “cadences and melodies”) and practice (shorthanded as “study,” but far more dynamic—a matter always of encounter and conversation and exchange, mutual transformation) and a style of the everyday (again, a counter ubiquity, albeit a utopian one, to stateliness).

Reading this book during the bombardment and invasion of Gaza—a horror beyond comprehension—and in the wake of the October 7th attacks—likewise, violence and terror beyond imagining—is a stark, I would say crushing, experience. But crushing most, for me, because I feel my own cynicism and despair shadowing over the very “embers” Boyarin says he wants his book to act as “a bellows” for: a revitalized justice-centered model of Jewish collectivity, engaged within the world, devoted to Talmud study, and relishing “Jewish pleasure, Jewish joy. The intimacies of shared history, languages, practices, songs, holy days, literature, political comradeship (Black Lives Matter), things we eat and things we don’t eat, and even, perhaps, the joys of transgression, all the things that all up to my most outrageous coinage, Jewissance ...” Here, it is worth noting explicitly another function of this slim text: it is a love letter, an aching expression of love for Jewissance and an audacious imagining of the best, most moral, possibilities of such Jewishness, a vision of Jews as “a diasporic nation with a culture and the capacity to care deeply and struggle for the oppressed of other nations as well (especially for the nation we have oppressed, the Palestinians).”

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NOTHING HAS TO MAKE SENSE: UPHOLDING WHITE SUPREMACY THROUGH ANTI-MUSLIM RACISM. By Sherene H. Razack. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2022. \$28.00, paperback. 276 pp.

Opening with a discussion of a range of popular “anti-Muslim T-shirts,” especially as displayed on the bodies of “protestors at freedom of speech rallies in Europe and North America,”

this book explores how the “intersecting colonial and imperial histories of the Americas and Europe incubate a contemporary transnational response to Muslims that contributes in significant ways to the global whiteness named by scholars as a spatial imaginary that organizes the world as a space over which the European stands as highest on an evolutionary scale.” Such T-shirts illustrate a key dynamic of this relation between anti-Islam and whiteness, what Razack calls an “emotional investment in whiteness achieved through the Muslim as racial Other.” This affect is so pervasive, in part due to the fact that it can be coupled with liberal feminist politics (fixating on an idea of Islamic misogyny, the supposed oppression manifest in the veil) or anti-immigrant and settler colonial politics, with the myriad commitments to free speech as an abstract ideal or with particular (if always exceptional) nationalist commitments. Anti-Muslim sentiment, Razack argues, consolidates “whiteness” (as aspiration and social location and state of mind) and thus contributes “to a global white supremacy.”

As a legal scholar, Razack focuses specifically on anti-Muslim racism in law and politics. “The Muslim emerges in law,” she writes, “as an effect of the legal groundwork laid by colonialism and slavery in the Americas and by its antecedents in Europe,” a fact that shapes reactions to school assignments feared to “indoctrinate” in the United States, policing of settler territory in Israel, and policies governing the legality of clothing for women in France. Indeed, the figure of the “niqab wearer is the gendered phantom at the epicenter of anti-Muslim politics, a figure who is imagined to be both victim and threat,” a figure “so overdetermined by notions of sexual and racial difference” that they can never “enjoy full personhood in the law.” Relatedly, Razack argues that Muslims generally remain “in the space of foreignness” when “granted inclusion” to liberal politics “on the ground of tolerable difference...” Pursuing this legal argument, Razack engages with a range of examples, from global “Anti-terrorism” security laws (read as an “international system of legal Apartheid”) to the treatment of Muslim prisoners, from laws banning niqab and other veils (which she productively compares to “the spatiality and scopic regimes” of laws on “unsightly beggars”) to policy fights over “multiculturalism” in the classroom. She also, engaging with the work of Nicholas De Genova, approaches the current immigration crisis in North Africa and Europe “not as a crisis but as part of a global racial formation (which De Genova labels anti-Blackness), one that continuously produces mass death.” Scholars of law and religion will be interested in such specific legal studies work, but they will also find Razack’s book useful for its approach to race. Razack is interested not only in explicitly religious justifications for anti-Muslim laws and policies but also in race’s origin within religion (Christianity) and the entanglement of religion with colonialism and imperial desire. The racialization of Muslims is always also a positioning in relation to law and (culturally Christian) states, Razack argues. Moreover, Razack